



Is Debt Overhang 
Causing Firms to Underinvest?
Filippo Occhino
Many economists have suggested that the weakness of corporate balance sheets is constraining business spending 
and investment, and that this in turn is impeding growth and the recovery. High levels of debt can depress spending 
and investment through several channels. This Commentary explains one of them—debt overhang can cause ﬁ  rms to 
underinvest—and points to ways in which this effect might be inhibiting the recovery.
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During the economic expansion that preceded the recent 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nanced the growth of their balance 
sheets largely by borrowing, which led to a substantial 
increase in the level of their debt. When asset prices and 
valuations fell suddenly during the crisis, the leverage ratios 
of these ﬁ  rms deteriorated as a result. One measure of corpo-
rate leverage, the ratio of ﬁ  rms’ credit market debt to assets, 
recently reached a new historical high (see ﬁ  gures 1 and 2).
Many economists have suggested that the weakness of 
corporate balance sheets is constraining business spending 
and investment, and that this in turn is impeding growth and 
the recovery. High levels of debt can depress spending and 
investment through several channels. Firms with high debt, 
for example, must devote more cash to interest payments, 
so they have less available for spending. The desire to repair 
their balance sheets may further discourage spending. Firms 
with weak balance sheets might also ﬁ  nd it harder to obtain 
external funds for new investment projects. And when they 
can raise external funds, they must pay higher rates, which 
increases their cost of investing.
One particularly important investment-damping channel 
is one where the overhang of existing debt distorts ﬁ  rms’ 
incentives to invest, leading them to invest less than would be 
optimal if they had fewer liabilities. This Commentary explains 
this channel and the ways in which it could inhibit the 
budding recovery.
The Debt-Overhang Distortion
A debt-overhang problem arises when the burden of existing 
debt on a ﬁ  rm’s balance sheet grows so large that the ﬁ  rm 
faces a high risk of default. This, in turn, causes the market 
value of the debt to fall substantially short of its face value. 
When this happens, the debt overhang will distort the ﬁ  rm’s 
incentives to invest, causing it to pass up otherwise proﬁ  table 
investment opportunities.
The reason the ﬁ  rm will underinvest in this situation has 
to do with who makes investment decisions and who reaps 
the beneﬁ  ts of the investments. The equity holders decide 
whether to ﬁ  nance new investments, but they will have to 
split any increase in the ﬁ  rm’s value with the ﬁ  rm’s creditors, 
since the market value of the ﬁ  rm’s debt will increase as well. 
The greater the extent to which a new investment beneﬁ  ts the 
creditors rather than the equity holders, the less attractive that 
investment is to the equity holders.
From the viewpoint of the equity holders, the debt-overhang 
distortion acts like a tax on the increase in the ﬁ  rm’s value 
generated by new investment projects, and this may lead 
them to forego investment opportunities with positive net 
present value. (See box inside.) In the end, ﬁ  nancial risk—the 
risk that a ﬁ  rm will default—may lead it to underinvest.
It’s not just existing debt overhang that could depress invest-
ment either. The chance of future debt overhang could curtail 
current investment as well. When a ﬁ  rm has the option of 
waiting to make investment decisions, the risk that it might 
face a future debt-overhang situation may lead it to postpone 
projects with positive net present values. This delay enables 
the ﬁ  rm to wait for the ﬁ  nancial uncertainty to be resolved and 
to undertake the project only if there is no debt overhang. In 
this case, it is ﬁ  nancial uncertainty—uncertainty about a ﬁ  rm’s 
future ﬁ  nancial strength—that may lead it to underinvest.
Debt overhang also distorts the composition of ﬁ  rms’ invest-
ments, in terms of their riskiness. Although debt overhang 
depresses safe investments, it may actually encourage riskier 
projects. Everything else equal, the equity holders have an 
incentive to undertake risky projects because equity holders 
beneﬁ  t from the upside of lucky outcomes, while the credi-
tors bear the downside risks.
Nor is the impact of debt overhang limited to investment deci-
sions. It also discourages other ﬁ  rm activities and decisions that imply a current cost and a future increase in the ﬁ  rm’s 
value, such as the work and effort exerted by managers and 
executives, hiring decisions, or expenditures incurred in order 
to maintain and improve production and sales. For instance, 
when a ﬁ  rm decides whether to hire, it weighs the current 
search, recruiting, and training costs against the future 
beneﬁ  ts offered by the additional productive worker. Just 
as debt overhang may lead ﬁ  rms to underinvest or to delay 
investing, it may lead them to restrain or delay hiring.
Some factors naturally mitigate the debt-overhang distortion. 
The desire to maintain a reputation or access to ﬁ  nancial 
markets, for example, gives some ﬁ  rms an incentive to avoid 
default, which encourages investment. The sizeable costs 
of bankruptcy can have the same effect. Evidence suggests, 
however, that the impact of the distortion is large.
The Impact of Debt Overhang
Various studies have quantiﬁ  ed the effect of debt overhang 
on investment. Among them, Hennessy, Levy, and Whited 
(2007) documented the importance of the debt-overhang 
distortion, especially for ﬁ  nancially distressed ﬁ  rms. They 
ﬁ  nd that debt overhang decreases the level of investment by 
approximately 1 to 2 percent for each percent increase in the 
leverage ratio of long-term debt to assets. This estimate for 
the debt-overhang impact is impressively large: it implies that 
a 10 percent decrease in assets, which is of the same order of 
magnitude as the one that occurred during the last ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, would cause a 10 to 20 percent decrease in the invest-
ment level.
Occhino and Pescatori (2010) take a macroeconomic perspec-
tive and show that the debt-overhang distortion ampliﬁ  es and 
propagates the effects of shocks to aggregate demand and 
supply. In addition to their standard contractionary effect, 
adverse macroeconomic shocks weaken ﬁ  rms’ balance sheets, 
increasing the debt-overhang distortion and diminishing 
ﬁ  rms’ incentives to invest. Because of this added effect, the 
impact of such shocks on the economy is much larger and 
more prolonged. For instance, the impact of a productivity 
shock on investment and production approximately doubles 
and extends for several years due to the propagation mecha-
nism created by the debt-overhang distortion.
Given the large impact that the debt-overhang distortion has 
on ﬁ  rms’ investment, hiring, spending, and effort levels, debt 
overhang is likely to have been an important factor constrain-
ing the recovery. It is likely that it is still exerting a drag on 
hiring, investment, and growth.
How fast the impact will dissipate and investment levels will 
return to normal depends on how fast deleveraging will take 
place and how soon corporate balance sheets will be repaired. 
In cases where the overhang is not too severe, these improve-
ments will occur through increased retained earnings, capital 
injections, and debt repayment. In worse cases, creditors may 
offer debt relief.
Debt Relief
The debt-overhang problem may be so severe that creditors 
can actually beneﬁ  t from forgiving a portion of the debt. 
With excessively high levels of debt, the risk of default is 
large and the market value of debt is well below its face value. 
If the creditors forgive part of the debt in this situation, the 
lower debt burden helps realign the interests of the equity 
holders and the creditors. The ﬁ  rm’s effort and investment 
will rise, increasing the total value of the ﬁ  rm and the market 
value of the remaining debt. If this effect is strong enough, 
the market value of the remaining debt may be even higher 
than the market value of the total debt in the absence of debt 
forgiveness, in which case debt relief will ultimately beneﬁ  t 
the creditors themselves.
Whether debt relief is ultimately in the interest of the credi-
tors depends on the speciﬁ  c case of debt overhang. There 
are cases where the senior creditors are willing to forgive a 
portion of the debt, renegotiate it, or give up their seniority 
so the ﬁ  rm can obtain external funds by issuing additional 
secured debt. On occasion, there may be uncertainty and 
disagreement among the creditors themselves on whether 
Figure 1. Assets and Debt
Note: Refers to the nonfarm nonﬁ  nancial corporate business sector.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
Figure 2. Debt as a Percentage of Assets
Note: Refers to the nonfarm nonﬁ  nancial corporate business sector. 
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Trillions of dollars How Debt Overhang Depresses Investment: An Example
Shareholders make investment decisions that will maximize their own beneﬁ  t. They don’t ﬁ  gure beneﬁ  ts to the ﬁ  rm’s creditors into their decisions.
Will shareholders invest in project A?
In this scenario, project A increases equity by $200. Since the cost is 
only $100, shareholders earn a $100 proﬁ  t by investing. Therefore, 
they choose to invest, and there is no debt overhang distortion.
The ﬁ  rm defaults The ﬁ  rm doesn’t default
In this scenario, project A increases equity by only $50. Since the cost is 
$100, shareholders lose $50 by investing. Therefore, they choose to not 
invest, and debt overhang distorts the investment decision. Although in this 
scenario the decision not to invest causes the ﬁ  rm to default, in more realistic 
cases, debt overhang makes ﬁ  rms underinvest, but does not necessarily lead 
them to default.
Scenario 1: No debt overhang Scenario 2: Debt overhang
debt relief is in their interest. When there are different classes 
of debt, the interests of creditors with different degrees of 
seniority may conﬂ  ict. In addition, a free-rider problem may 
arise, as debt relief may not be in the interest of the creditors 
taken individually even if it beneﬁ  ts them as a group.
Although debt relief obviously alleviates the debt-overhang 
problem, it only represents a partial solution. Because the 
creditors offer debt relief only if they expect to beneﬁ  t from it, 
the amount of debt they are willing to forgive is limited, and 
any debt remaining continues to distort the ﬁ  rm’s investment 
decisions.
A creditor takeover of the ﬁ  rm after it defaults is another 
potential solution to the debt-overhang problem. Creditors 
would have an incentive to undertake all proﬁ  table invest-
ment opportunities. However, this solution is not satisfactory 
Don’t invest Invest Don’t invest Invest
The ﬁ  rm doesn’t default The ﬁ  rm doesn’t default
In this scenario an 
adverse balance sheet 
shock has lowered the 
value of assets relative 
to the ﬁ  rst scenario.
Liabilities fall 
when ﬁ  rm 
defaults
Assume discount rate is zero, 
so project A has positive net 
present value.
Project A
Current cost: $100 | Future increase in ﬁ  rm’s asset value: $200
Starting balance sheet
Assets = $1,000 Liabilities = $900
Equity = $100
Starting balance sheet
Assets = $750 Liabilities = $900
Equity = –$150
Shareholders will invest only if the beneﬁ  t from the project—the in-
crease in equity—exceeds the cost of the project. The cost is $100, 
but the beneﬁ  t depends on the condition of the ﬁ  rm’s balance sheet. 
Let’s see how the beneﬁ  t changes in different scenarios.
Resulting balance sheet
Assets = $1,200 Liabilities = $900
Equity = $300
Resulting balance sheet
Assets = $1,000 Liabilities = $900
Equity = $100
Resulting balance sheet
Assets = $950 Liabilities = $900
Equity = $50
Resulting balance sheet
Assets = $750 Liabilities = $750
Equity = $0
With debt overhang, shareholders would rather decline project A, even in the extreme case where the ﬁ  rm will default without it and leave the shareholders with zero 
equity. Why? If they invested, they would sustain the entire cost of the project but receive only part of the beneﬁ  t. The other part goes to the creditors. 
Debt Relief. The second scenario in the box above provides an 
example in which offering debt relief would be in the interest of 
the creditors. Suppose the creditors forgave part of the debt, 
decreasing the face value from $900 to, say, $800. Shareholders 
would rather undertake Project A and avoid the ﬁ  rm’s default, a 
choice that would ultimately beneﬁ  t the creditors as well. 
either, since most investment opportunities depend on busi-
ness continuity and disappear or lose substantial value when 
default occurs and the equity holders lose control of the ﬁ  rm.
Reducing the Risk of Debt Overhang
Some common borrowing practices and debt contract features 
have the effect of reducing, although not eliminating, the risk 
that ﬁ  rms will wind up with debt overhang. Shortening debt 
maturity is one example. The debt-overhang distortion is 
associated with debt that matures after investment decisions 
are made, that is, long-term debt. Issuing and rolling over 
short-term debt, for which the terms of the debt contracts can 
be modiﬁ  ed depending on a ﬁ  rm’s condition, may reduce the 
likelihood of debt overhang.
The practice of matching the maturities of the ﬁ  rm’s assets 
and liabilities also reduces the likelihood of debt overhang. 
This is because the total value of a ﬁ  rm can be thought of as 
the sum of the value of the already installed assets plus the 
value of future investment opportunities. When the existing 
debt exceeds the value of the already installed assets, the dif-
ference needs to be repaid with the increase in the ﬁ  rm’s value 
generated by new investments. This means that part of the 
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creates the debt-overhang underinvestment problem. By 
matching the maturities of its assets and liabilities, the ﬁ  rm is 
effectively reducing the debt-overhang distortion.
The provision of a sinking fund, a separate account in which 
the ﬁ  rm deposits money at a predetermined schedule for the 
purpose of amortizing a loan over time, has an effect similar 
to matching maturities. The fund effectively decreases the 
level of the ﬁ  rm’s liabilities as the value of the already installed 
assets depreciates over time, so it also helps to reduce the likeli-
hood of debt overhang.
Covenant restrictions in the debt contract also reduce the 
likelihood of a future debt-overhang problem. Such covenants 
are aimed at preserving the value of the senior debt. Some 
covenants are designed to preserve the value of the ﬁ  rm’s 
assets that can be seized by creditors, like covenants designed 
to preserve the liquidation value of collateral or to limit the 
ability of the ﬁ  rm to sell its assets. Other covenants protect 
the value of the senior debt by restricting the ﬁ  nancing policy, 
maintaining the seniority, limiting leverage ratios, and con-
straining the capital structure. Other covenants restrict the 
ﬁ  rm’s distribution policy, limiting the cash payout through 
dividends and share repurchases.
For ﬁ  rms to face the proper incentive to reduce risks, how-
ever, it is important that creditors correctly assess, monitor, 
and price those risks. During the years that preceded the 
recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, creditors became less concerned about 
leverage and risk. Those years were characterized by low 
risk premiums, relaxed lending standards, light-covenant 
agreements, and easy credit. With the beneﬁ  t of hindsight, it 
might be argued that risk premiums remained excessively low 
and risk was mispriced, and that these factors helped cause the 
current situation of weak balance sheets and debt overhang.
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